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Abstract 
 
Investments in Information Technology (IT) are an increasing part of organizational expenditures in 
spite of the fact that there is little evidence in the existing literature that suggests these investments are 
related to the organization’s performance. The uncertainty of IT investment payoff should be reflected 
in other managerial decisions. This research examines Rozeff's (1982) agency cost/transaction cost 
tradeoff model to determine if IT investments are related to dividend payout ratios for an organization. 
A dividend payout model including an IT investment variable is estimated. The estimation results 
suggest that a significant positive relationship exists between dividend payout and a firm’s IT invest-
ments. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
he significance of the information technology (IT) function in organizations is growing rapidly as 
organizations strive to build more effective processes and become more competitive. This fact, coupled 
with the explosion of electronic commerce, has created an ever increasing demand for additional IT 
spending. IT spending, given the uncertainty of returns, could be viewed as inherently riskier than traditional investments. 
Shareholders, lacking the information available to managers, could potentially demand higher returns to compensate for 
assuming a higher level of risk. 
 
 Investments in IT represent a special case of firm investment that carries greater payoff uncertainty than 
traditional investments. Dos Santos (1991) indicated several problems with the typical IT investment studies including 
difficulty in estimating cash flows and lack of immediacy in payoffs. According to Bensaou and Earl (1998), other 
problems with investment in IT included inadequate payoffs and too much “technology for technology’s sake.” Agency 
theory defines a clear link between a firm’s investments and its dividend policy. The purpose of this note is to investigate 
whether management attempts to differentiate between IT investment and projects that fit more traditional capital 
budgeting models when establishing dividend policy. 
 
Information Technology Investment 
 
 A number of studies have indicated that investors differentiate between the types of investments firms undertake 
typically resulting in stock price fluctuation. McConnell and Muscarella (1985) found that unanticipated changes in 
capital expenditure do indeed impact share price positively or negatively depending on the aggregate perception of 
"good" or "bad" investment decisions. Others such as Statman and Sepe (1989) uncovered market reactions to the 
termination of certain investment projects while Chauvin and Hirschey (1993) found a positive market reaction to 
increased firm spending on advertising and research and development. All of these studies used standard event study 
methodology to gauge market or investor reaction. The authors of these studies, as mentioned earlier, addressed 
___________________ 
Readers with comments or questions are encouraged to contact the authors via email. 
T 
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managerial decisions that are more readily labeled as "good" or "bad."  However, investments in IT were not as easy to 
classify.  
 
 The managerial and financial impacts of investments in IT on the firm continue to be hotly debated. Numerous 
studies, including Hitt and Brynjolfson (1996) and Kivijarvi and Saarinen (1995), have addressed the relationship 
between IT investments and some measure of financial performance and/or productivity. These studies found linkages to 
exist but with the expected productivity and financial payoffs often accruing only in the long-term or when the IT 
investment is coupled with complementary business strategies. Even then, excessive profits were not necessarily linked to 
IT investment. 
 
 Other researchers, such as Mahmood and Mann (1993), discovered that IT investments were strongly 
interrelated with strategic and economic performance measures. In their study, various operational definitions related to 
IT investment variables, such as organizational IT expenditures as a percentage of revenue, percentage of IT budget spent 
on training, and number of computers and terminals as a percentage of total employees, were found to have impacted 
such factors as sales by employee, return on sales, and market to book value. Grover et al. (1998) also supported the 
connection between IT investment and firm strategy. Rai et al. (1997) concluded that the impact of IT investment on 
productivity and performance possibly depends on management processes and IT-strategy links.  
 
 Bharadwaj et al. (1999) argued that the problems associated with accounting measures of firm performance are 
that traditional accounting measures reflected only historical information and do not adjust for risk. To address these 
concerns, their study used Tobin's q to measure firm performance. Their research suggested that IT investments indeed 
positively affect the performance of the firm. 
 
 According to Thorp (1999), IT investments were not a technical issue but a business issue. CEOs and all other 
managers have realized that IT investments only account for a fraction of the total investment that organizations make 
and that these IT investments are essential.  
 
 In assessing the impact of IT investments on firm’s performance, this research decomposes investments into two 
specific cateogories: traditional investments and IT investments. IT investments are perceived to be more risky than its 
traditional counterpart. 
 
Agency Theory and the Dividend and Investment Linkage 
 
 According to Jensen and Meckling (1976), agency theory addresses the potential difficulties arising from the 
separation of ownership (stockholders) and management. Stockholders, to ensure management acts in their best interest, 
force firms to incur monitoring costs. One way that stockholders monitor management is to force firms to periodically 
enter the external markets seeking capital (Easterbrook, 1984). Higher dividend paying firms are frequently forced to the 
external markets to secure adequate funds for investment and therefore are more heavily scrutinized by the financial 
markets during the security issuance process. Thus, in an agency framework, dividend payment serves as a monitoring 
function. 
 
 Conversely, Miller and Rock (1985) maintained that the dividend and investment decision are "flip sides of the 
same coin." Firms desiring additional investment funds, automatically by default, make lower dividend payments since 
internally generated funds are the cheapest source of financing. Dividends are only distributed if firms run out of 
profitable investment options. Firms making investment decisions that are clearly perceived as "good" investments can 
more easily follow this residual dividend policy and distribute lower payouts. A survey by Baker et al. (1985) indicated 
that management views the dividend decision as an active policy variable.  More recently, Moh'd et al. (1995) concluded 
that managers appear to adjust dividend payout over time and across firms.  If shareholders perceive IT investments to 
create wealth, regardless of time horizon, firms should be able to distribute lower dividends and be forced less frequently 
into the external capital markets.  
 
 However, investments in IT are a special case of investment. There is no indication to date that IT investment 
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consistently results in a positive net present value investment opportunity. This uncertainty, or increased risk surrounding 
the IT investment decision, could create investor demand for higher dividend distributions to more closely monitor firm 
management. If so, a positive relationship between IT investment and dividend payout would be expected.  This paper 
aims at examining this proposition empirically. 
 
Dividend Model Specification and Relevant Literature 
 
 This study addresses the issue of the impact of information technology by extending Rozeff's (1982) agency 
cost/transaction cost tradeoff model of dividend policy. Rozeff maintained that a firm's optimal dividend policy will 
balance the firm's demand for funds with the investor's demand for bonding management (an agency cost). Firms electing 
to distribute a cash dividend would be forced into the external capital markets for needed funds and subject themselves to 
the scrutiny of some third party. This action lowers agency costs but conversely increases transaction costs associated 
with raising external capital. 
 
 A number of recent studies, (Rao and White (1994), Casey et al. (1999), Casey and Dickens (2000) and 
Noronha et al. (1996)) have used extensions of Rozeff's agency cost/transaction cost tradeoff model to investigate various 
aspects of dividend policy. Rozeff's original model contained five variables: 1. the percentage of insider ownership, 2. 
past growth rate of revenues, 3. expected growth rate of revenues, 4. a firm's beta, and 5. the natural log of the number of 
common stockholders. A discussion of the justification for each variable follows. 
 
 According to Rozeff (1982), the higher the percentage of stock held by insiders (INS), the lower the dividend 
payout ratio. Dividend payment functions as a bonding cost by decreasing the time and effort expended by outside 
ownership to monitor the corporation. If insiders hold a significant portion of shares, the demand for higher dividend 
payouts falls. Conversely, if insiders own very little of the firm's stock, then higher dividend payouts function to lower 
monitoring costs. 
 
 Rozeff also expected the previous five year average growth rate of revenues (GROW1) to have a negative 
impact on dividend payout policy. The rationale of this relationship is the higher the past revenue growth, the higher the 
past demand for investment funds to support that revenue growth. Rozeff considers the forecasted five year revenue 
growth (GROW2) to be a proxy for future investment capital needs. The expected relationship is also negative. The 
higher the forecasted revenue growth, the lower the dividend payout ratio, assuming maintenance of a target capital 
structure. 
 
 Rozeff (1982) used beta to proxy a firm's operating and financial leverage. According to Rozeff, a firm with a 
higher use of total leverage would have a higher beta. Therefore, to lower the cost of external financing, these higher beta 
firms would choose lower dividend payout ratios. Dividend payout should then be negatively related to beta.  
Rozeff hypothesized the dispersion of ownership, as measured by the total number of stockholders, should also affect 
dividend payout ratios. A smaller number of stockholders would be able to monitor the firm more easily than a larger 
number. Therefore, as the number of stockholders increases, the likelihood of higher dividend payout ratios also 
increases. Again, the distribution of dividends functions to reduce monitoring costs. The natural log of the number of 
shareholders (STOCK) corrects for scale effects. 
 
 Rozeff (1982) found all five original variables to be significant in explaining dividend payout. Later studies by 
Dempsey and Laber (1992) and Dempsey et al. (1993) replicated and extended Rozeff (1982) by examining another 
seven year period. These studies confirmed the stability of Rozeff's original five variable model.  
 
 A specific variable to measure the impact of IT investment on dividend policy will be added to Rozeff’s original 
model. Information management spending data, including sales, administrative, research and development, and other 
general IT expenses, from several hundred companies were available via the Internet (Strassmann, 1997).  In previous 
studies, IT investments have been measured in a variety of ways including IT expenses as a percentage of revenue (Weill 
and Olson, 1989) and IT expenses as a percentage of premium income in the insurance industry (Bender, 1986).  In this 
study, the IT variable added to the original model was operationalized as the information management spending as a 
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percentage of net income.  The authors recognize that there are many different risk-types of IT investment making it 
problematic to only use a single measure. Unfortunately, lack of data availability precludes separation into IT risk classes 
for this study. However, the fact that the typical investor also lacks the ability to determine the appropriate risk 
classification creates even more investor uncertainty. Also because of smallness of sample size, we refrain from assessing 
interindustry differences at this time. 
A presentation of Rozeff’s original agency cost/transaction cost tradeoff model and a modified version of it that includes 
IT investment follows: 
 
PAYi = α0 - α 1INSi - α 2GROW1i - α 3GROW2i - α 4BETAi + α 5STOCKi + ε ij      (1) 
 
PAYi = α 0 - α 1INSi - α 2GROW1i - α 3GROW2i - α4BETAi + α5STOCKi + α 6ITINVi  eij    (2) 
 
Where: 
 
PAYi = Dividend payout ratio of firm i for 1995. 
INSi = Percentage of common stock held by insiders for firm i.    
GROW1i = Realized five year average growth rate of revenues for firm i. 
GROW2i = Forecasted future five year average growth rate for firm i. 
BETAi = Firm i's beta coefficient. 
STOCKi = Natural logarithm of number of common stockholders for firm i. 
ITINVi = Firm i’s information management spending in 1995 as a percentage of net income. 
ε ij  = error 
2
j), j = 1, 2. 
 
 Note that the operational signs indicate the hypothesized direction of the impact each variable should have on 
dividend payout policy in both models. For this study, PAYi is calculated using a one year dividend payout ratio 
consistent with Moh’d et al. (1995). Rozeff's original study used a seven year period while Dempsey and Laber (1992) 
used alternative two-year and four-year mean payout definitions and found the model to be robust over these shorter time 
horizons. 
 
The Sample 
 
 One hundred seventy-two firms were selected from the 1995 Global Information Productivity Rankings 
(Strassmann, 1997). These firms were cross-referenced with Compact Disclosure, which was used to provide the financial 
data for the study. Fifty-two firms were discarded due to 1) unavailability of financial data, 2) no dividends were paid 
during 1995, and/or 3) the related dividend payout ratios were negative.  Table 1 depicts the number of firms from each 
industry out of the one hundred twenty firms included in the final analysis. 
 
 Table 2 shows descriptive statistics related to the variables used in the study. The table illustrates considerable 
variability associated with each studied variable. Table 3 displays the correlation coefficients between the explanatory 
variables as well as between them and the dependent variable. The table indicates that all Pearson correlation coefficients 
between each of the independent variables and PAY are significant (p< 0.065). All of such coefficients have the expected 
signs as depicted in model 1. Furthermore, the correlation between the variable ITINV in model 2 and PAY appears to be 
positive. The presence of significant correlation among some of the independent variables is indicative that the estimated 
regression equations might include insignificant term(s).  
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Estimation Results 
 
 Regression models 1 and 2 were estimated using the 
method of ordinary least squares (OLS). The estimation results 
related to models 1 and 2 are depicted in Table 4. 
 
 Model 1 has an F-ratio of 5.315 that is significant (p< 0.01). 
The coefficient of determination R
2
 indicates that 18.9% of the 
variance in the dividend payout ratio is explained by the related 
independent variables. The coefficients of the variables historical 
growth rate (GROW1), predicted growth rate (GROW2), and natural 
log of the number of stockholders (STOCK) are significant (p<0.05) 
in the regression equation. All coefficients in the estimated model 
show the appropriate signs even when the parameter estimates were 
not significant. 
 
 Model 2 appears to be much more robust with an R
2
 of .291 
and an F-ratio of 7.715 that is significant (p< 0.01). For this model, 
the coefficients related to GROW1, GROW2, STOCK, and the IT 
investment variable (ITINV) are significant (p< 0.05). The 
information technology (ITINV) coefficient is positive and 
significant at the 0.01 level indicating the existence of a significant 
positive relationship between IT spending and the dividend payout 
ratio. 
 
 A reduced model, model 3, was derived from the full model 2 upon setting the coefficients of both the variables 
BETA and INS, that were insignificant in model 2, to zero. The estimation results of the reduced model are shown in 
Table 4. Model 3 appears to be robust, as well, with an R
2
 of .280, which is close to that of model 2, and an F-ratio of 
11.153 that is also significant (p<0.01). All coefficients included in the reduced model are significant at the 0.02 level. It 
is worthy to mention at this point that when expression (2) was estimated using a forward stepwise regression procedure 
for which α =0.05, the estimates related to model 3 were exactly reproduced. The initial variable to enter the model was 
ITINV with a corresponding R
2
 value of 0.087. This quantity represents 31.07% of the R
2
 magnitude reported for model 
3, with all four variables included. In addition, the absolute value of the partial correlation coefficient (these coefficients 
are independent of the units of measurement and show the correlation between the independent variable when the 
influence of other independent variables are held constant) attains its largest value for the variable ITINV (see last remark 
in Table 4). Some writers (e.g. Neter et al., 1990) use such coefficients to compare the impact of variables in multiple 
regression. Accordingly, we may conclude that the ITINV variable has the largest influence on the dependent variable 
PAY. 
 
 An examination of variance inflation factors (Neter et al., 1990) was performed to address multicollinearity. The 
analysis did not suggest that multicollinarity was an issue. Furthermore, there were no indications that heteroscadasticity 
was a problem (White, 1990) adding more credence to the robustness of the model. Finally, after careful examination of 
studentized deleted residuals and leverage values (Neter et al., 1990), eleven outliers were detected. A follow up 
diagnostic analysis using DFFITS, Cook’s D, and DFBETAS revealed, however, that the outliers were not influential. 
Accordingly, no observations were required to be deleted (Neter et al., 1990). A description of the diagnostics mentioned 
above is found in the Appendix. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1 
Number of firms included in study by 
industry 
 
Apparel    4 
Automotive   3 
Beverages   3 
Chemical    8 
Construction   5 
Diversified   10 
Drugs/Health   10 
Electrical    2 
Electronics   6 
Food    10 
Machinery   6 
Metals    4 
Miscellaneous   9 
Paper    3 
Petroleum   9 
Printing    2 
Recreation   8 
Retail    9 
Textiles    2 
Transportation   2 
Utilities    5 
Total               120 
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Table 2: 
Descriptive statistics of variables used. 
Variable Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum Coefficient of Variation 
 
INS 
 
0.052 
 
0.091 
 
0.000 
 
0.522 
 
1.750 
GROW1 2.951 1.882 0.080 11.290 0.638 
GROW2 12.106 3.208 3.900 29.200 0.265 
BETA 1.010 0.347 0.151 2.519 0.344 
STOCK 70.648 136.974 70.648 136.973 1.938 
ITINV 2.488 3.991 0.0002 24.207 1.604 
PAY 0.428 0.307 0.018 2.000 0.717 
INS: % insider ownership 
GROW1: Historical 5 year growth rate 
GROW2: Predicted 5 year growth rate 
BETA: Corporate beta 
STOCK: Number of stockholders (millions) 
ITINV : Information management expenditures as a percentage of net income 
PAY: Dividend payout ratio (dependent variable) 
 
 
 
Table 3: 
Pearson correlation coefficients among variables. 
 
Variable 
 
INS 
 
GROW1 
 
GROW2 
 
BETA 
 
LNSTOCK 
 
ITINV 
 
PAY 
INS 1.000       
GROW1 -.146 1.000      
GROW2 .292** -.369** 1.000     
BETA .024 .068 .228* 1.000    
LNSTOCK -.245** .125 -.126 -.050 1.000   
ITINV .106 -.356** .146 -.110 -.353** 1.000  
PAY -.170a -.198* -.207* -.202* .199* .295** 1.000 
INS: % insider ownership 
GROW1: Historical 5 year growth rate 
GROW2: Predicted 5 year growth rate 
BETA: Corporate beta 
LNSTOCK: Natural log of the number of stockholders (millions) 
ITINV : Information management expenditures as a percentage of net income 
PAY: Dividend payout ratio (dependent variable) 
*  Significant at the 0.05 level 
** Significant at the 0.01 level 
a  P-value = 0.064 
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Table 4: 
OLS regression results for dividend payout ratios. 
Independent 
Variables 
Regression Model 1 Regression Model 2 Regression Model 3a 
 
Constant 
 
0.284 
(.425) 
 
-0.328 
(0.384) 
 
-0.454 
(0.372) 
INS -0.329 
(0.305) 
-0.302 
(0.287) 
 
GROW1 -0.0519** 
(0.015) 
-0.0340* 
(0.015) 
-0.0351* 
(0.015) 
GROW2 -0.0237* 
(0.009) 
-0.0246** 
(0.009) 
-0.0288** 
(0.008) 
BETA -0.0993 
(.078) 
-0.0635 
(0.074) 
 
TOCK 0.0409* 
(0.020) 
0.0679** 
(0.020) 
0.0736** 
(0.019) 
ITINV  0.0280** 
(.007) 
0.0288** 
(.007) 
R2 .189 .291 .280 
F-statistic 5.315** 7.715** 11.153** 
Prob. > F .000 .000 .000 
N 120 120 120 
   Standard error of estimated coefficients are reported in parentheses 
*  Significant at the 0.05 level 
** Significant at the 0.01 level 
a   Partial correlation coefficients for variables GROW1, GROW2, STOCK, and ITINV are 
   -0.218, -0.312, 0.332, and 0.363 respectively 
 
 
 When more parameters are in a model, the goodness of fit of the model measured in terms of R
2
 improves (Neter 
et al., 1990). If the sum of squares of errors in the full model, SSE(F), is not much less than the sum of squares of errors 
in the reduced model, SSE(R), using the full model does not account for much more of the variability in the dependent 
variable (Neter et al. , 1990). To put this another way, when SSE(F) is close to the SSE(R), the variation of the 
observations around the fitted regression equation for the full model is almost as great as the variation around the fitted 
regression equation for the reduced model. In this case, the added coefficients in the full model really do not help to 
reduce the variation in the dependent variable about the fitted regression equation. In order to test the appropriateness of 
the reduced model (Model 3), the following test statistic (3) is computed using the information contained in the ANOVA 
tables pertaining to Models 2 and 3 shown in Table 5: 
 
F* = SSE(R) - SSE(F)        SSE(F)         (3) 
               dfR - dfF                  dfF 
 
Where: 
 
SSE (F) = Sum of Squares of the error terms of the full model (Model 2) = 7.946. 
SSE (R) = Sum of Squares of the error terms of the reduced model (Model 3) = 8.068. 
dfF = degrees of freedom in the full model = 113. 
dfR = degrees of freedom in the reduced model = 115. 
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 The calculated value of F* was only 0.889 
whereas tabulated F(0.05;2,113) = 3.09 implying that 
the reduced model provides almost as much 
explanatory information about the dependent 
variable, PAY, as the full model. This indicates that 
the reduced model (Model 3) derived from the full 
model (Model 2) is appropriate. 
 
Comparison of Models 
 
 We first note that Rozeff’s original model 
(Model 1) and its reduced modified version that 
includes an IT investment variable (Model 3) are two non-nested models. (Two models are said to be non-nested if one 
model cannot be obtained from the other through equating some coefficients in the first (second) model to zero in order 
to produce the second (first) model.) To test the null hypothesis that these two competing non-nested models are equally 
close to the true data generating process against the alternative hypothesis that one model is closer, a J-test proposed by 
Davidson and MacKinnon (1981) is employed (See Appendix for details).  Designating Model 1 as f and Model 3 as g, 
the J-test entails estimating the following two compound models: 
 
PAYi = (1−αN) fi + αN igˆ + εNi         (4) 
PAYi = (1−αA) fi + αN ifˆ + εAi         (5) 
 
where α N and α A are regression coefficients to be estimated,   Ni  Ai are error terms. Davidson  Davidson 
and MacKinnon (1981) showed that the t-statistic of α N is asymptotically normal (N(0,1)) when model f is the preferred 
one, whereas the t-statistic of α A is asymptotically normal (N(0,1)) when model g is the preferred one.  
 
 Since the OLS results associated in estimating equations (4) and (5) show that the estimated α N coefficient is 
statistically significantly different from zero = 0.05 level (t=4.022) and the estimated α A coefficient is 
not statistically significantly different from zero at the same level (t=1.311), we conclude that Model 3 is preferred to 
Model 1 as it appears to be better supported by the data (see decision rules in the Appendix for more details.) 
 
Conclusions 
 
 Partington (1985), in a survey of Australian firms, identified several important managerial motives for dividend 
payout.  His study indicated that management viewed dividend policy as an active managerial tool consistently used to 
convey information to shareholders. Managers, therefore, should consider the impact of various investments on the 
shareholders and allay shareholders concerns via dividend distribution.  The primary contribution of this paper is that it 
clearly identifies an agency connection between dividend policy and IT investment. The significant positive sign on IT 
investment indicates that management believes investment in IT warrants additional dividend distribution to reduce 
agency costs. Further research is needed to fully understand the relationship between IT investments and other managerial 
decisions.   
 
Suggestions for Future Research 
 
 Much of the previous work in this area treats the IT investment decision in isolation.  As this research indicates, 
the IT investment decision impacts other previously unrecognized areas of the firm.  Additional research should focus on 
the interrelationships between the IT investment decision and other managerial decisions.     
 
 
 
 
Table 5: ANOVA tables for models 2 and 3 
Model Source of Variation Sum of Squares df 
2 Regression 3.254 6 
 Residual 7.946 113 
 Total 11.198 119 
3 Regression 3.130 4 
 Residual 8.068 115 
 Total 11.198 119 
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Appendix 
 
The J Test 
 
Consider the null (HN) and alternative (HA) hypotheses represented by the following non-nested models: 
 
HN: Yi = fi (Xi  γ) + εNi                                  (A.1) 
HA: Yi = gi (Zi ,  γ) + εAi                                  (A.2) 
 
Where 
 
Yi the the i-th observation on the dependent variable, 
Xi and Zi are vectors of observations on exogenous variables, 
β and γ are coefficient vectors to be estimated, and  
ε Ni and εAi N
2
 A
2
), respectively. 
 
The J-test equation is given by the following artificial regression equation: 
 
Yi = (1- αN) fi (Xi, β) + αN  igˆ , + εNi    `    (A.3) 
 
Where 
 
igˆ = gi (Zi, ˆ ), ˆ  is the least squares estimate of γ derived from estimating equation (A.2),  
αN is a regression coefficient, and ε Ni is an error term. 
 
The J-test considers that HN is true if α N equals zero; if α N is significantly different from zero, HN is rejected. 
 
Because the J-test is an asymmetric test, it is necessary to reverse the roles of HN and HA in equations (A.1) and (A.2), 
and the corresponding version of equation (A.3) becomes 
 
Yi = (1- αA) gi (Zi, γ) + αA  ifˆ , + εAi        (A.4) 
 
where  
 
ifˆ =fi (Xi, ˆ ), ˆ  is the least squares estimate of γ derived from estimating equation (A.1), 
α A is a regression coefficient, and ε Ai is an error term. 
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The execution of the J-test leads to one of the four conclusions depicted in the following table. 
 
Possible types of results from the J-test 
Type Regression Results Conclusion from Tests 
 
1 
α A = 0; α N = 0 
 
Neither HA nor HN can be rejected 
2 α A ≠ 0; α N = 0 Reject HA ; accept HN 
3 α A = 0; α N ≠ 0 Accept HA ; reject HN 
4 α A ≠ 0; α N ≠ 0 Reject both HA and HN 
 
Description of Diagnostics 
 
Variance Inflation Factors: These factors measure how much the variances of the estimated regression coefficients are 
inflated as compared to when the independent variables are not linearly related. 
 
Studentized Deleted Residuals: For a certain observation, it represents the difference between the actual value of the 
dependents variable and its expected value relative to its standard error, after the deletion of that observation. 
 
Leverage Values: For a certain observation, it measures the distance between the independent variable related to that 
observation and the center of such variables. 
 
DFFITS: It represents the difference between the fitted value of the dependent variable for a certain observation when all 
N observations are used in fitting the regression equation and the predicted value of the same when the observation is 
omitted in fitting the equation. 
 
Cook’s Distance Measure: It considers the influence of a certain observation on all the N fitted values of the dependent 
variable. 
 
DFBETAS: It shows for a particular observation the difference in estimating a certain regression coefficient relative to its 
estimated standard error upon the deletion of the observation from the regression analysis. 
 
(For more details regarding the above diagnostics, see Neter et al. (1990) 
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Notes 
